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Abstract 
 
Previous studies have identified the rivalry among 
technological platforms as one of the main driving forces of 
broadband services penetration. This paper draws on data 
from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011 to estimate 
the main determinants of broadband prices. Controlling for 
broadband tariffs features and network variables, we 
examine the impact of the different modes of competition 
on prices. We find that inter-platform competition has no 
significant effects over prices, while intra-platform 
competition is a key driver of the prices charged in the 
broadband market. Our analysis suggests that the impact of 
different types of competition on prices is critically affected 
by the levels of development of the broadband market 
achieved by the considered country. 
JEL classification: L38, L51, L96 
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade, many governments have considered access to high-speed data networks –
otherwise known as broadband networks1
The expansion of broadband technology has been reported as having a major impact on the 
economic growth of a country. Koutroumpis (2009) found that a 1% increase in the penetration 
rate of broadband services in 22 OECD countries resulted in a 0.025% increase in their growth
rate. Qiang and Rossotto (2009) conducted a similar exercise in a study that grouped countries 
according to their income level. Their results suggested that in high-income countries, each 
additional percentage point in broadband penetration amounted to a 0.121% increase in the GDP 
growth rate while for low- and middle-income countries it represented a 0.138% increase.
– a priority in the design of their economic growth 
policies. One of the most recent examples lending support to this assertion can be found in the
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which comprised a package of measures to
stimulate the U.S. economy: among the items budgeted were 7,200 million dollars assigned to the 
completion of broadband networks.
In the light of these findings, Katz and Suter (2009) sought to quantify the expected impact of 
the measures promoting broadband penetration in the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. They estimated the effect of investments to be the direct creation of over
128,000 jobs and the formation of network externalities that would generate a further 270,000 jobs
over the following four years.
1 There are three main network types known as broadband platforms:
xDSL (Digital Subscriber Line) Platforms: xDSL technology is based on the conversion of the copper pair
telephone line into a basic high-speed digital line that can carry broadband services as well as transmit 
voice. The connection speed of this technology ranges from 256 Kbps to 40 Mbps.
Cable modem platforms or HFC (hybrid-fiber coaxial): These hybrid networks combine optical fiber and 
coaxial cable. Cable platforms were deployed in many countries before the emergence of the broadband 
internet service as initially they were built to broadcast television frequencies. Later, in the mid-90s, TV 
cable operators adapted their facilities so as to offer broadband internet services too. Cable platforms can 
achieve data transmission speeds in excess of 100 Mbps.
Optical Fiber Platforms or FTTx: Today, this technology permits the highest data transmission speed for 
internet access. Fiber optic platforms can offer internet data speeds higher than 1 Gbps.
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Thus, while there may be some discrepancies in the exact impact of the expansion of
broadband networks, all studies seem to report a positive impact on economic growth. For this 
reason, governments continue to implement policies aimed at promoting access to broadband. 
However, direct government investment is not the only way to promote the technology with one of 
the basic tools for enhancing the penetration of broadband services being the promotion of 
competition among telecommunication operators. In recent years, the debate as to what 
constitutes the best market structure for maximizing such competition has been lively.
Two types of competition have developed in most broadband markets: first, inter-platform 
competition, i.e., competition between two technology platforms (typically xDSL and cable 
platforms) in the same area; and, second, intra-platform competition, i.e., competition between
operators using the same technology platform (as we shall see below, this type of competition is 
limited to xDSL platforms and requires regulatory intervention).
Various studies (Distaso et al., 2006; Bouckaert et al., 2010) have analyzed the market in 
these terms and present evidence to indicate that inter-platform competition is the driving force 
behind the expansion of broadband services, while they have tended not to find a positive impact 
in the case of intra-platform competition.
This paper draws on data from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011. The market was 
characterized by a low level of broadband diffusion among the population and the charging of 
higher prices than those applied in many European countries. Our aim here is to determine 
whether the results for the Spanish market verify previous empirical findings regarding 
competition (i.e., the dominance of inter-platform competition) and to identify the causes of the 
delayed development of broadband technology in this specific market. Although the study focuses 
on Spain, our findings should be valid for other countries with a similar development of broadband 
technology.
The empirical analysis reported here makes two main contributions to the literature. First, we 
examine the effects of different competition modes on broadband price levels as opposed to their 
impact on penetration rates, which is the usual variable studied in the literature. Second, we take 
into account all the prices of each telecom operator in the Spanish market, whereas previous 
studies have opted to use aggregated data at the national level. This approach allows us to 
examine the specific impact individual operators might have on market price performance. In 
contrast with previous studies, we find that intra-platform competition has been the main driver of 
price levels, while the impact of inter-platform competition has been insignificant.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
development of broadband technology, focusing on the situation of the Spanish market. Section 3 
describes different forms of competition in the broadband market and reviews the literature. 
Section 4 presents the empirical model and discusses the results. Section 5 closes with a 
summary of the main results and their implications for public policy.
2. Origin and development of broadband platforms
The need for deploying broadband networks among a high percentage of the population results 
from the technological revolution initiated by the expansion of the internet in the early 1990s. At 
the outset, most users had a narrowband access to internet based on a dial-up modem via a 
standard phone line. However, the exponential growth of Internet connections explains why these
narrowband networks, which were nevertheless crucial for internet development, became an
obstacle as users sought to access services requiring markedly higher connection speeds. The
telecommunications industry responded to these new demands – both from the residential and 
business segments – by developing new technology platforms (i.e., xDSL, cable modem and 
FTTx), the so-called broadband networks.
Since the creation of these platforms, the number of broadband users has grown exponentially. 
An OECD study conducted in 2011 reported that up to a quarter of the population of its member 
countries accessed internet via broadband platforms, equivalent to 309 million broadband users. 
Moreover, in the last decade, broadband had experienced annual growth rates higher than 40%. 
The study also reported that certain European countries –including, France, the UK and Germany 
– all presented very similar levels of penetration and all of them above the OECD average. By 
contrast, a group of other countries – including, Spain, Austria, Italy and Greece – found 
themselves lagging some distance behind the leading group and at levels below the OECD 
average.
Three main groups of operators can be identified in the Spanish broadband market: 1) the 
incumbent who owns the public switched telephone network deployed in the country – Telefónica
de España, 2) cable operators who provided their own network access nationally or regionally,
and 3) alternative xDSL operators that need to access, at least partially, the incumbent operator’s 
network to offer their broadband services. FTTx or WiMAX access technologies have only a 
residual presence in Spain.
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Table 1. Development of broadband platforms in Spain
Coverage Market Share (%) Variation (%)2004 2011
Narrowband platforms National 35.2% 0.5% -98.5%
Broadband platforms National/Regional 64.8% 99.5% 53.6%
Incumbent Operator National 54.9% 49.2% -10.5%
xDSL alternative operators National 16.3% 29.6% 81.8%
unbundled local loop (%) 27.8% 79.5% 186.0%
bitstream (%) 72.2% 20.5% -71.6%
Cable operator National 21.2% 14.3% -32.6%
Others cable operators Regional 4.9% 6.5% 31.7%
Other platforms (e.g. 
WiMAX) Regional 0.4% 0.5% 12.9%
Table 1 shows that, since 2004, alternative xDSL operators have increased their market 
significantly – almost doubling their market presence, while Telefónica de España and national 
cable operators have suffered a significant loss of their market share. Particularly notable has 
been the evolution of national cable operators, whose market share has fallen by 32.6 per cent
over the last seven years. Regional cable operators have fared better but their market share – 6.5 
per cent – remains small in national terms. Finally, Table 1 shows, as mentioned above, that 
virtually no internet users today access via narrowband platforms.
The international comparison of prices in the broadband market is complicated for various 
reasons, including: nonlinear pricing structures (that is, flat rates that include a single fixed fee for 
a service, regardless of usage), the great variety of commercial offers (tariffs with several 
connection speeds or with a monthly data allowance) and the existence of multiproduct services
(i.e., bundled products combining fixed telephony, television, etc.). Yet, despite these difficulties,
several organizations – including the OECD, ITU and CMT2 – have sought to undertake an 
international comparison of broadband prices. The CMT, for example, publishes a half-yearly 
study of broadband tariffs reporting the prices of bundled offers (including broadband and fixed
telephony voice services) in Spain compared to average EU prices (see Figure 1). This offer is 
used as the reference price for broadband services since it is the most heavily demanded product
in the Spanish market, accounting for 73.4 per cent of all broadband contracts.
2 Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones – Spain’s regulator of the telecom sector.
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Figure 1. Price comparison of fixed bundled tariffs, June 2010
 
Source: Based on information supplied by CMT
 
The report shows that the prices of broadband services in Spain are significantly higher than 
those charged on average in the EU. Likewise, the reports published by international 
organizations3
In short, Spain’s broadband market charges higher prices than those of its EU counterparts, 
while the penetration rate remains low with respect to these countries. This situation may well be 
indicative of an abnormality in the level of competition, with the effect that Spain’s market is some 
way from achieving optimum conditions of competition. For this reason, this study seeks to
identify the impact of different forms of competition on the Spanish market and to quantify their 
influence on the expansion of broadband services.
present similar findings.
3 See Van Dijk Management Consultants (2010) Broadband Internet Access Cost (BIAC). European 
Commission, Information Society and Media Directorate-General, Brussels.
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3. Modes of competition in the broadband market
The aim of this paper is to examine the influence of different types of competition on prices in 
the broadband market. In this regard, previous studies have detected two types of competition:
inter-platform and intra-platform competition. The main features of each of these modalities are 
summarized below.
3.1. Inter-platform competition
Historically, in Spain – as in most other European countries – only one telecom operator 
(Telefónica de España) supplied the market under monopolistic conditions and was responsible 
for the deployment of the telecommunications network throughout the country. The public 
switched telephone network (PSTN) was based on twisted copper pair cabling facilities which 
carried voice analog signals between telephone exchanges and customers’ homes. Later, with the 
digitization of analog signals, it became possible to offer broadband internet services via the 
PSTN using xDSL technology.
However, xDSL platforms are not the only telecommunications network to offer broadband 
services. Thus, in the early 1990s new telecom operators started to offer broadband services via
alternative platforms4
Today, broadband internet access in Spain is provided principally by two technology platforms:
xDSL and cable. The two platforms are completely independent of each other and there is no 
need to establish an interconnection to provide internet access. This means that the competition
between telecom operators providing different platforms (either cable or xDSL) presents different
characteristics to those that typify other forms of competition.
. The platform that has enjoyed the greatest success has been the coaxial 
cable network (HFC).
3.2. Intra-platform competition
The main barrier to entry that new operators must overcome in a market such as that of 
broadband internet access is the high level of initial investment required to deploy their own 
platform. One way of reducing this risk is to allow potential operators to lease the incumbent’s
4 Fixed Wireless Access (WiMax), Satellite or Cable Platforms.
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network facilities in exchange for a rental fee fixed by the national regulatory authority (NRA).
Cave et al. (2001) claim that new operators would tend to start their activity by renting the 
incumbent’s network, since their volume of investment in their own facilities is initially very low. 
Later, as the new operators increase their volume of investment, their independence increases 
with respect to the incumbent’s network. Via this process, known as the investment ladder theory, 
new operators are encouraged to become progressively more competitive.
Thus, on the first rungs of the investment ladder, entrants deploy only a small volume of their 
own facilities. Subsequently, the new entrants begin to invest in more expensive facilities, typically 
ones that are more difficult to replicate, until they reach the higher rungs of the ladder. Thus, it is 
the objective of the NRA to ensure that new operators reach these higher investment rungs since 
the more independent they can become of the incumbent, the more capable they are of offering
high quality services at competitive prices. In order to attain this goal, NRAs regulate the prices 
charged to entrant operators at each step in the market access process. The prices fixed serving 
as incentive for operators to start making their own investments. Thus, Cave and Vogelsang
(2003) recommend charging new entrants low prices to access the incumbent’s network but then
gradually increasing prices according to the replicability of each level.
The culmination of this process should ensure a high competitiveness of alternative operators
and enable users to reap the benefits of a high level of market competition (primarily, lower prices 
and higher rates of domestic broadband penetration). As such, intra-platform competition is 
generated by operators using totally – or partially – the same technological platform (in this case 
the xDSL platform). Moreover, the characteristics of this competition differ from those in which 
different technological platforms compete – i.e., inter-platform competition.
A number of empirical studies (Wallsten, 2006; Bouckaert et al., 2010) split intra-platform
competition according to the type of access gained by the alternative operator to the incumbent’s 
platform. Thus, they distinguish between service-based competition and facilities-based 
competition. The former involves operators on the lower rungs of the investment ladder that
provide telecommunication services via resale or bitstream access. In this case, operators are not 
required to invest heavily but rather rent most of the incumbent’s facilities. The latter involves 
operators that only rent local loop access from the incumbent, with the corresponding need to 
invest in their own facilities.
Our objective in what follows is to identify the type of competition – inter- or intra-platform –
that has had the greatest impact on the development of broadband internet access in Spain.
However, at the same time, we also seek to analyze the additional impact of each of these two 
forms of intra-platform competition.
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3.3. Empirical studies: Inter-platform vs. intra-platform competition
In their study of 46 US states, Aron and Burnstein (2003) found inter-platform competition to 
be a significant and positive variable for explaining the broadband penetration rate. Additionally,
they claim that providing new entrants with unbundled local loop access might affect their
incentives to invest in their own alternative platforms. Similarly, Garcia-Murillo and Gabel (2003)
argue that there is no evidence to suggest that unbundled local loop access is associated with 
greater rates of broadband adoption.
Distaso et al’s. (2006) study is more similar to ours as it seeks to determine whether it is 
better to promote competition between xDSL platform operators (i.e., intra-platform competition)
or to stimulate the entry of new platform operators thereby promoting competition in a multi-
platform environment (i.e., inter-platform competition). They found the inter-platform concentration 
variable to be negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that this competition mode was 
the main driver of the diffusion of broadband services. By contrast, the intra-platform 
concentration variable was positive and non-significant, suggesting that the positive effect
attributable to a higher degree of intra-platform competition is offset by its negative impact on
inter-platform competition.
These results are supported by Bouckaert et al. (2010) who analyzed broadband penetration 
rates across 20 OECD countries from December 2003 to March 2008. They failed to find results 
that lend empirical support to the investment ladder theory; indeed, their evidence suggests that
encouraging intra-platform competition may be negative for promoting investment in
telecommunication networks. By contrast, they found that higher values of inter-platform 
competition led to higher levels of broadband adoption. Furthermore, they suggest that service-
based intra-platform competition – i.e., alternative operators providing bitstream access – could 
undermine broadband diffusion.
In short, most empirical studies identify inter-platform competition as the key policy driver for 
promoting broadband adoption and facility investment. By contrast, intra-platform competition
does not appear to have a significantly positive effect, and some studies even suggest it might 
have a negative impact on broadband development. The main aim of this current study is to 
assess whether inter-platform competition is the main dynamic force in promoting broadband 
adoption in the Spanish market.
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4. Empirical analysis
In this section, we outline the data, variables and the empirical model that we develop to 
analyze the impact of different types of competition on prices. Specifically, we estimate an 
empirical model in which the dependent variable is the price of broadband services supplied by 
Spanish telecom operators. The explanatory variables capture different attributes of tariffs, as well 
as the intensity of intra- and inter-platform competition. 
The data were collected from various sources. Broadband access information is taken from the 
quarterly and annual reports published by CMT, the Spanish telecommunications authority.
Broadband access prices are taken from the webpages of the telecom operators and from the 
Comparativa internacional de ofertas comerciales de banda ancha, a biannual report of 
broadband access prices published by CMT (2007 to 2011).
Given the threefold classification of broadband access operators (the xDSL incumbent operator 
and owner of the PSTN; alternative xDSL operators that access, at least partially, the incumbent 
operator’s network; and cable operators using their own access platform), in order to represent
the Spanish market structure faithfully, data have been collected from six telecom operators: the 
incumbent (Telefónica de España), four alternative xDSL operators (Vodafone, Jazztel, Orange
and Ya.com) and, finally, one cable operator (ONO). The data used in this study range over 14
periods with each operator being observed in quarterly time intervals between December 2005
and June 2011. However, data are not available for all six operators for the entire period for 
various reasons  – including, for example, merger and acquisition processes between the 
companies5. Consequently, we work with an unbalanced panel data, containing a total of 138
observations.
4.1. Dependent variable: prices
Most earlier studies employ the broadband penetration rate as their dependent variable. One of 
the main contributions of our study, however, is to estimate the impact of different modes of 
competition on broadband service prices, as opposed to on the broadband penetration rate. Thus,
the dependent variable here is constructed from the broadband access tariffs offered by telecom 
operators.
5 In June 2007, for example Ya.com was absorbed by Orange for 320 million euros.
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Given the wide range of broadband access services available on the market (different data 
transfer speeds, broadband access bundled – or otherwise – with other telecommunication 
services, etc.) we considered it necessary to establish a selection criterion for tariffs that provides 
a faithful representation of the prices fixed by each operator. Thus, each broadband operator is 
represented by two tariffs: first, its lowest tariff (best entry) and, second, the tariff contracted by
the highest number of customers. The frequency of the data is biannual.
4.2. Competition variables
As noted above, we are primarily concerned with measuring the impact of each mode of 
competition – inter-platform and intra-platform – on broadband access prices in the Spanish
market. Our reason for analyzing a specific geographic market is to confirm if the variables that 
have been shown to affect broadband penetration rates internationally – and, at the same time, 
broadband access prices – maintain this effect in the Spanish case. However, unlike previous 
studies, we use operator data as opposed to data by geographic region (i.e., by country). By so 
doing, we should be able to isolate the specific effects of operator characteristics that might affect
broadband access prices.
However, comparing the broadband tariffs of operators in the same market (rather than 
between countries) means that we must find different explanatory variables to those employed to 
date in the literature. For example, previous studies have used the Herfindahl index as a proxy for
the level of concentration/competition in a given market (Distaso et al., 2006). In our study, these
variables are useless as they estimate the level of competition in a complete geographic market.
Instead, therefore, we construct two variables that serve to estimate the impact of each operator
on both modes of competition:
INTRA: This variable measures the level of market competition between xDSL platforms,
i.e., intra-platform competition. The variable is defined as the total number of alternative 
xDSL operator subscriptions in relation to the total number of incumbent xDSL 
subscriptions. Formally:
,
where is the number of subscriptions provided by alternative xDSL operator i and
is the number of incumbent xDSL subscriptions.
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INTER: This variable measures the level of market competition between different platforms
(xDSL and Cable). The variable is defined as the total number of subscriptions of cable 
operator j as a share of the whole volume of xDSL subscriptions in the broadband access 
market. Formally:
,
where and Yj is the number of subscriptions provided by cable operator j
4.3. Broadband tariff features
In order to capture the features of the broadband tariffs, we employ the following variables:
SPEED: Broadband speed (MB) offered at the prevailing broadband tariff.
BUNDLE: A variable that takes the value 0 when the tariff offers only broadband access, 1 
when broadband access is bundled with a fixed phone service and 2 when the broadband 
service is bundled with telephony and television.
BITSTREAM: A variable that takes the value 1 when the service is provided on the basis 
of reselling or bitstream access to the incumbent’s network, and the value 0 when the 
operator provides broadband services with forms of access on the final rungs of the 
investment ladder theory (primarily, shared and unbundling local loop). As such, this 
variable is used to measure the impact of service-based intra-platform competition on price 
levels.
CAPPED: Dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when the tariff offers limited data
allowances.
4.4. Network variables
The variable LINE contains the broadband subscriptions of each telecom operator. Telecom 
services belong to a network industry and as such are likely to be affected by substantial scale 
economies. Hence, operators with a large number of subscribers will incur lower costs due to their 
being able to exploit these economies of scale. 
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The following table summarizes the model’s explanatory variables, the expected effect of each 
on the dependent variable, the justification for these expectations, and the empirical literature that 
supports these expected outcomes:
Table 2.  The main variables, hypotheses, arguments and references to the literature
Variable Hypothesis Argument Literature
INTRA
Positive or non-
significant relationship 
with broadband 
access price
Positive effects of higher intra-platform 
competition are offset because this mode 
generates, in turn, less inter-platform 
competition
Garcia-Murillo & 
Gabel (2003), 
Wallsten (2006), 
Distaso et al. (2006) 
and Bouckaert et al. 
(2010).
INTER
Negative relationship 
with broadband 
access price
Rivalry between technological platforms is 
one of the most important driving forces 
promoting broadband competition. As a result, 
a higher inter-platform competition promotes 
the broadband   penetration rate and impacts 
negatively on broadband access prices. 
Distaso et al. (2006) 
and Bouckaert et al. 
(2010)
SPEED
Positive relationship 
with broadband 
access price
Broadband data speed affects consumer 
willingness to pay for broadband access 
services.
Not considered in the
literature
BUNDLE
Positive relationship 
with broadband 
access price
The greater the number of telecom services 
unbundled in the tariff, the higher the prices 
the subscriber should pay.
Not considered in the 
literature
BITSTREAM
Positive relationship 
with broadband 
access price
Broadband service in geographic areas where 
alternative xDSL operators do not invest 
sufficiently in facilities is provided primarily 
with reseller or bitstream access and, 
consequently, prices are higher.
Bouckaert et al. 
(2010)
CAPPED
Negative relationship 
with broadband 
access price
Limited data allowances negatively affect 
consumer willingness to pay for broadband 
access services.
Not considered in the 
literature
LINE
Negative relationship 
with broadband 
access price
The likely existence of economies of scale 
allows operators with large numbers of 
subscribers to save costs 
Not considered in the 
literature
Although the empirical literature to date analyzes the size of demand – represented by the
broadband penetration rate – and we focus on broadband prices, the results of earlier studies 
remain valid here as the two concepts are inversely proportional.
Note that four of the variables have not, to the best of our knowledge, been analyzed in the 
existing empirical literature. The evaluation of their impact on broadband access prices is possible 
here because we analyze the broadband services offered by telecom operators in a single 
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geographic market, unlike the majority of previous studies that undertake international 
comparisons of countries using aggregated data.
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation, while Table 4 
shows the matrix of bivariate correlations for the variables in Table 2. Note that the LINE and 
concentration variables (INTRA and INTER) could be highly correlated simply because of the fact 
that we use the number of subscribers in calculating the concentration variables. A strong 
correlation would be indicative of a multicollinearity problem and, therefore, the regression
coefficients related to the two highly correlated variables would be unreliable.
Nevertheless, the results from the matrix reject this possibility as the correlation between these 
variables is not considered significant. This can be explained by the fact that the variables capture 
different effects: on the one hand, LINE captures scale economy effects on broadband prices; on 
the other, INTRA and INTER seek to capture the two modes of competition in the broadband 
market.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variable Nº of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRICE 138 38.375 8.424 21.700 54.870
INTRA 138 0.071 0.076 0 0.242
INTER 138 0.036 0.080 0 0.259
SPEED 138 5,352.580 6,571.677 256.000 20,480.000
BUNDLE 138 0.739 0.457 0.000 2.000
LINE 138 1,298,841 1,538,084 225 5,557,510
BITSTREAM 138 0.014 0.120 0 1
CAPPED 138 0.123 0.330 0 1
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Table 4. Correlation matrix
PRICE INTRA INTER SPEED BUNDLE LINE BITSTREAM CAPPE
D
INDEX YEAR
PRICE 1
INTRA -0.29 1
INTER 0.03 -0.42 1
SPEED 0.22 -0.02 0.12 1
BUNDLE 0.16 0.23 -0.02 0.35 1
LINE 0.11 -0.06 0.18 0.08 -0.07 1
BITSTREAM 0.01 0.15 -0.05 -0.04 -0.19 0.01 1
CAPPED -0.39 -0.20 -0.10 -0.18 -0.31 0.17 -0.04 1
INDEX -0.20 -0.05 0.50 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.10 1
YEAR -0.22 0.13 0.02 0.44 0.24 0.46 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 1
4.5. Econometric specification and results
Taking the previous hypotheses into consideration, the equation to be estimated can be 
expressed in the following linear form:
The monthly rental price of broadband access provided by operator i at moment t is a function
of (a) the level of competition within xDSL platform (INTRA) at moment t-1, (b) the level of 
competition between different technology platforms providing broadband access (INTER) at 
moment t-1, (c) the broadband speed offered in the tariff (SPEED) at moment t, (d) the number of 
telecom services available as a bundle in the tariff (BUNDLE) at moment t, (e) the number of 
subscriptions held by operator i (LINE) at moment t-1, (f) the fact of reseller or bistream modality
being used by operator i to provide broadband services (BITSTREAM) at moment t, and (g) the 
limited data allowances included in the tariff (CAPPED) at moment t.
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As for the dependent variable (PRICE), the value of the price variable at moment t is unlikely to 
be independent of the value of that variable at moment t-1. For this reason a serial autocorrelation 
problem is likely to exist, that is, there might well be a correlation between the error terms at 
different points in time. In this regard, the Wooldridge test results confirm the existence of serial 
autocorrelation. Thus, we ran the regressions accounting for the presence of autoregressive 
residuals.
The price equation includes several one-period lagged explanatory variables (t-1) given that 
their full effect takes time to make an impact on the dependent variable. Intra-platform competition 
(INTRA), inter-platform competition (INTER) and the size of the company (LINE) do not affect 
broadband prices during the same period, but rather have an impact on the operators’ future
pricing strategies.
Our empirical analysis also takes into account differences between the six operators, which is 
critical for accounting effectively for their specific characteristics. Operators are likely to differ in 
terms of their productive efficiency, facilities, and the like. In general, two types of model are 
available for capturing cross-sectional heterogeneity in the context of a panel data model: fixed 
effects and random effects models. In both specifications, specific effects are estimated for each 
operator, but the models differ in terms of whether the operator effects are modeled as 
predetermined or as random form. In practice, this difference can be critical as the results from 
fixed effects and random effects models may diverge significantly. 
Statistically, fixed effects can always be used with panel data as they invariably provide 
consistent results, but they may not be the most efficient model to run. The reason for their
inefficiency is that fixed effects estimations only capture the within variation. By contrast, random 
effects provide a more efficient estimator because they take into account both within and between 
variations. Yet, the random effects estimation might not be consistent because these effects might 
be correlated with the explanatory variables. The Hausman test can be used to choose the most 
appropriate model in our context. 
In addition, and as explained above, a final refinement has been made to the model to correct 
for serial correlation. Thus, the first and second columns in Table 6 display the estimates for the 
fixed effects and random effects specifications with the inclusion of a first-order autoregressive 
random disturbance term. Finally, for the sake of completeness, we estimate the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) pooled model with the serial correlation removed using the Prais-Winsten method.
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Table 6. Results for broadband prices in the Spanish market  (Dependent variable: 
logPRICE)
Fixed Effects AR(1) Random Effects AR(1) Pooled OLS AR(1)
INTRA -2.093876 ***(.5892367)
-.6047259 *
(.374151)
-.7925918 **
(.418387)
INTER 1.748077(1.805935)
.0930224
(.4284781)
-.2781357
(.380742)
logSPEED .0339936 **(.0164309)
.0223975 *
(.0132035)
.0302341 **
(.0156207)
BUNDLE .0217309(.0284938)
.0303285
(.0247976)
.0324847
(.0229636)
logLINE .2882073 ***
(.0386816)
-.0168363
(.0113629)
.0040782
(.01868)
BITSTREAM .1945929 ***(.0749071)
.1544576 **
(.0726255)
.1278966 *
(.0802769)
CAPPED -.090846  *(.0537335)
-.202256 ***
(.0446619)
-.2284793 ***
(.0493321)
Const -.5469296 **(.2807027)
3.704808 ***
(.1413816)
3.405026 ***
(.2418176)
N 126 126 138
R2 0.4591 0.2317 0.9568
Hausman Test (RE vs 
FE) 79.42 ***
Baltagi-Wu Test 1.3975 1.3975
 
Under the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the error term and the regressors, the 
results of the Hausman test indicate that the null hypothesis of orthogonality is rejected. As a 
result, the panel data model with fixed effects is preferred to that with random effects. Therefore, 
we focus the rest of our discussion on the estimates obtained from the panel data model with 
fixed effects, but note that all the estimated models produced fairly similar results. The estimation 
based on fixed effects (FE) gave an R2 of 0.4591, which confirms that the proposed model 
provides a satisfactory fit of the explanatory power. The result of the Baltagi-Wu test supports the 
adjustments carried out in accordance with the Wooldridge test results and also confirms that the 
problem of autocorrelation has been successfully corrected.
Our results for the two variables measuring the degree of market competition show that each 
mode of competition has a different impact on broadband access prices. Hence, while competition 
between xDSL platforms (INTRA) has a negative and significant effect on the price level in three
of the models estimated, competition between different technological platforms (INTER) is not 
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significant in any case. In other words, intra-platform competition is the key variable to understand 
the evolution in broadband prices in the Spanish market.
As for the variables used to define the characteristics of the broadband tariffs, all are found to 
have a significant impact on the dependent variable with the exception of the dichotomous 
variable used to specify how many services are bundled in the tariff (BUNDLE). Hence, the 
BUNDLE variable is insignificant because operators tend to include fixed phone services in 
broadband tariffs without any additional price increase.
The broadband speed variable (SPEED) has a significant and positive effect on broadband 
prices. Thus, the faster the broadband speed subscribers contract, the more expensive are the 
tariffs they pay. 
The dummy variable which reveals whether the service is provided by reseller or bitstream 
access (BITSTREAM) is significant and positive, i.e. the offers provided by this modality of access
are more highly priced because the tariffs are offered in places where alternative operators have 
yet to invest sufficiently in network facilities. This result suggests that service-based intra-platform 
competition would not help to reduce broadband prices.
The limited data allowances variable (CAPPED) is significant and negative as such tariffs
target subscribers with lower data usage. Consequently, consumers that accept this limitation 
benefit from discounted prices.
The size of each operator in terms of their respective number of subscribers (LINE) is shown to 
be significant and positive. This result therefore rejects the hypothesis that larger operators set 
lower prices thanks to the existence of scale economies. 
The estimated results reported here differ from those reported previously. First, our results 
suggest that the degree of competition within xDSL platform (INTRA) is critical in explaining the 
price level of broadband access services in the Spanish market. By contrast, previous studies, 
including Distaso et al. (2006) and Bouckaert et al. (2010), report that this variable has an 
insignificant or even negative impact on the market. Second, the aforementioned studies identify 
inter-platform competition as the driving force in the promotion of broadband adoption. This result
runs contrary to the obtained here, given that the variable measuring this form of competition
(INTER) is not significant.
Given these results, we infer that broadband prices in countries such as Spain, characterized 
as they are by a lower rate of development of their broadband markets, may respond differently to 
the various modes of competition. Indeed, we have observed differences between countries with 
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regard to the diffusion of their cable platforms: even though all cable operators have had to invest 
in order to provide a broadband service, the initial investment required to start this service was not 
similar in all countries. The reason lies in the fact that, before expanding their broadband services,
several countries built a cable network dedicated to broadcasting audiovisual content, whereas in
other countries the presence of cable networks was only residual as audiovisual content was
broadcast by alternative networks (for example, in the case of Spain, this service was provided by
radio waves). Thus, the supply of cable broadband services in this latter group of countries meant 
their having to start from scratch the construction of a new network. Consequently, the investment 
required in this group of countries was much higher than that in countries where a cable network
with national coverage already existed.
This high level of initial investment may have weakened the competitiveness of the new cable 
operators with respect to those that had been supplying broadcasting services for years in other 
countries. The competitive weakness of the cable networks in these countries would seem to 
have ensured that it was the intra-platform competition that became the real driving force in the 
diffusion of broadband services.
In short, the theoretically positive effects of the emergence of a new broadband platform 
appear not solely to be determined by its mere creation, but are also influenced by other 
circumstances that might even undermine the potential benefits.
5. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the main variables that account for the evolution of broadband 
technology and a set of related factors in the Spanish market. The literature tends to identify inter-
platform competition, i.e., the competition that exists between platforms based on different 
technologies, as one of the main factors driving the international expansion of broadband 
services. By contrast, intra-platform competition, i.e., the competition generated from regulating 
access by alternative operators to the incumbent operator’s platform, has had a much weaker 
impact on the development of the broadband market, with some studies concluding that it can 
even have a detrimental impact on its expansion. 
Our analysis, however, points to the fact that these earlier findings are not necessarily valid for 
all countries, an example being the Spanish market. As outlined in this paper, the diffusion of 
broadband access in Spain shows a delay with respect to the average rates achieved in other 
European countries in terms both of penetration rates and of prices. Our results for the Spanish 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2013/03 pàg. 22
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/03 pag. 22
22
case are diametrically opposed to those reported in most studies in the literature; to the effect that 
the intra-platform competition has been the main driving force for the expansion of broadband
access in Spain, whereas the inter-platform competition appears to have had no impact on its 
development.
This result suggests that the Spanish market has benefited from potentially positive effects in 
line with predictions made in the framework of the investment ladder theory. In other words, the 
regulation of access to the incumbent’s platform for alternative operators has emerged as a key 
variable in promoting broadband adoption. By contrast, the positive effects attributed to the 
competition between different technologies have not been recorded in the case of the Spanish 
market. It is our belief that external variables that could affect the potential platform and, therefore, 
inter-platform competition, must be taken into account. The presence in some countries of cable 
TV platforms before the emergence of broadband services would seem to be a basic element in 
determining the competitiveness of this technological platform.
In short, policymakers seeking to place their countries at the forefront of telecommunication 
technology need to encourage broadband uptake. This goal, however, can only be achieved by 
increasing the competitive pressure on the pricing of such services. In order to fulfill these 
objectives, the promotion of tools that can ensure that the market will benefit from inter-platform 
competition seems essential. Failure to do so might mean that external variables related to the 
specific characteristics of the national markets can neutralize these potentially positive effects. 
Today, this question is acquiring even greater importance, at a time when new technology 
platforms based on optic fiber are set to generate major economic benefits.
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